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Nondiscrimination and Religious Affiliation: The
Ninth Circuit Upholds the Denial of Registered
Status to a Christian Student Club in Alpha Delta
Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed
I. INTRODUCTION
“[E]galitarianism has become one of the most commanding
drives in U.S. higher education, a nearly ubiquitous pressure on
every segment of and activity in academe.”1 As egalitarian programs
in higher education have become more prevalent, constitutional
challenges to those programs have likewise increased.2 Recently,
Hastings Law School adopted a nondiscrimination policy that denied
registered status to any student club that refused to adopt an allcomers policy, meaning that clubs could not restrict membership on
any basis.3 As a result, the university denied recognized status to a
Christian club that required its members to espouse Christian
beliefs.4 The club challenged the policy in Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez but lost.5 The Supreme Court, for prudential reasons,
declined to address the constitutionality of a policy that would deny
registered status only to groups that discriminated on particular
bases.6
In Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, the Ninth Circuit
addressed the very question that the Supreme Court left unanswered
in Christian Legal Society.7 The Ninth Circuit analyzed the
constitutionality of San Diego State University’s nondiscrimination

1. GEORGE KELLER, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE NEW SOCIETY 84 (2008).
2. See Frank A. Schmidtlein & Robert O. Berdahl, Autonomy and Accountability, in
AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND
ECONOMIC CHALLENGES 83 (Philip G. Atbach et al. eds., 2011) (noting that “[r]ecourse to
the courts to settle disputes has increased greatly during the past four decades,” due in part to
affirmative action in admissions); see, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
3. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971
(2010).
4. Id. at 2980.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 2984 n.10.
7. 648 F.3d 790, 795 (9th Cir. 2011).
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policy, which allows student groups to discriminate on any basis
except for prohibited criteria—race, religion, sex, sexual orientation,
and others.8 Two Christian SDSU clubs sued, arguing that the policy
violated their First Amendment rights of speech, expressive
association, and free exercise of religion.9 The Ninth Circuit rejected
these claims, relying on its own precedent and on Christian Legal
Society.10
The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Christian Legal Society was
misplaced because the Supreme Court strongly distinguished a policy
like the one at SDSU, which prohibits only some forms of
discrimination. In addition, the Ninth Circuit failed to reconcile its
decision with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Rosenberger v. Rector
and Visitors of the University of Virginia11 and erred by holding that
SDSU’s policy was viewpoint-neutral.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
SDSU operates a student organization program in which clubs
can apply for recognized status,12 a designation that provides various
university benefits, including funding, rights to use the university’s
logo and name, use of university rooms and office space, and
publicity in school publications at no cost.13 The plaintiffs in the case
were a Christian sorority, Alpha Delta Chi, and a Christian fraternity,
Alpha Gamma Omega.14 The plaintiffs applied for recognized status,
but the university denied the applications because of the clubs’
requirement that members profess Christian beliefs.15 That
requirement, according to university administrators, violated the
school’s nondiscrimination policy, which reads:
On-campus status will not be granted to any student organization
whose application is incomplete or restricts membership or
eligibility to hold appointed or elected student officer positions in
the campus-recognized chapter or group on the basis of race, sex,

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
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Id. at 796.
Id.
Id. at 803.
515 U.S. 819 (1995).
Alpha Delta Chi-Delta, 648 F.3d at 796.
Id.
Id. at 795.
Id. at 796.
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color, age, religion, national origin, marital status, sexual
orientation, physical or mental handicap, ancestry, or medical
condition, except as explicitly exempted under federal law.16

Thus, unlike officially recognized clubs, the plaintiffs had to pay
to use university buildings for events and meetings.17 Additionally,
although the plaintiffs could distribute flyers and try to recruit
members, they had to stay in areas open to anyone, “such as the ‘free
speech steps’ of the student union and the wall next to the university
bookstore.”18
There was strong evidence that this policy was not applied
uniformly to all organizations at SDSU.19 Although the university
denied plaintiffs’ applications because of their religious requirement,
the university had granted recognized status to other religious
student groups that had similar requirements, including a group
called the Catholic Newman Center.20 Furthermore, the school
officially recognized some nonreligious student groups that
discriminated in contravention of the policy, including the African
Student Drama Association.21
The plaintiffs brought a suit in federal court,22 arguing that the
university’s nondiscrimination policy violated their rights of free
speech, freedom of expressive association, free exercise of religion,
and equal protection under the law.23 On cross-motions for summary
judgment, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion and
granted the defendants’ motion on all counts.24 The plaintiffs then
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.25
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND: FREE SPEECH &
EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION
Because the Ninth Circuit centered most of its analysis on the
plaintiffs’ free speech and freedom of expressive association claims,
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 803–04.
Id. at 803.
Id. at 804.
Id. at 790.
Id. at 804.
Id. at 796.
Id.
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this section will discuss the contours of those legal doctrines,
focusing on cases with facts based in a university setting. This
analysis tracks the evolution of these two doctrines leading up to
Christian Legal Society.
A. Free Speech
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”26 The
Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to mean that
“government may not regulate speech based on its substantive
content or the message it conveys.”27 Viewpoint discrimination,
where the government targets “particular views taken by speakers on
a subject,” is an “egregious form of content discrimination.”28
Although the First Amendment protects the speech of students
and faculty on campuses of public universities,29 the right is analyzed
differently from speech in public forums, such as public parks and
streets.30 Student-club programs at universities are treated by courts
as limited public forums.31 Under the limited forum doctrine, in
which the government provides a forum “that is limited to use by
certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain
subjects,” the government can impose reasonable speech restrictions
that are viewpoint-neutral.32 In a limited forum, the government is
not obligated to “allow persons to engage in every type of speech.”33
For example, a government may reserve a forum for use by particular
speakers or for discussing certain topics so as to confine the forum
“to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created.”34

26. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
27. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995).
28. Id. at 829.
29. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268–69 (1981); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169,
180 (1972) (“[W]e note that state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the
sweep of the First Amendment.”).
30. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5; see also Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of The Univ.
of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
31. Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 n.12.
32. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009) (citations
omitted).
33. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001).
34. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
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Judicial review under the limited public forum doctrine consists
of two inquiries: (1) whether the regulation is “‘reasonable in light
of the purpose served by the forum,’” and (2) whether the
regulation discriminates on a viewpoint basis.35 For example, in
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, the
Supreme Court held that the university violated student publishers’
free speech rights by withholding on the basis of the publishers’
religious views funding that was available to all other student
publishers.36
B. Freedom of Expressive Association
The right to associate “for the purpose of engaging in those
activities protected by the First Amendment” is protected by the
Constitution.37 This associational right is fundamental to the exercise
of other First Amendment rights because those rights “could not be
vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a
correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends
were not also guaranteed.”38 One way to violate this right is to
“impose penalties or withhold benefits from individuals because of
their membership in a disfavored group.”39 Similarly, the right is
infringed when the government “forces [a] group to accept members
it does not desire.”40 “Freedom of association therefore plainly
presupposes a freedom not to associate.”41
Where a regulation infringes on the right of association, a court
will uphold the regulation only if it serves “compelling state
interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be
achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational
freedoms.”42 Thus, in Roberts v. Jaycees, the Supreme Court held that
although a men-only organization’s expressive association rights had
been infringed by a state’s requirement that it allow women, the
state’s interest in eliminating gender discrimination was a compelling

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2988 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829).
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822–23.
Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
Id. at 622.
Id.
Id. at 623.
Id.
Id.
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interest that justified the infringement.43 By contrast, the Supreme
Court held in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bi-Sexual
Group that parade organizers’ right of expressive association was
violated by the application of a state law that required the organizers
to include a group in the parade with which the parade organizers
disagreed.44
C. Combining These Rights: Christian Legal Society
In 2010, the Supreme Court decided Christian Legal Society,
wherein the Court introduced a new method for analysis of the two
above rights.45 Because of the similarity between Christian Legal
Society and Alpha Delta, a brief discussion of the case is included
here.
1. Facts of Christian Legal Society
Like San Diego State University, the Hastings College of Law
operates a student-organization program in which students can apply
for recognized status.46 Hastings has in place an “all-comers”
nondiscrimination policy which requires student groups to “allow
any student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership
positions in the organization, regardless of [her] status or beliefs.”47
Hastings denied recognized status to a religious student group, the
Christian Legal Society, because the group allowed membership only
to those who shared its Christian beliefs.48

43. Id.
44. 515 U.S. 557, 581 (1995); see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644
(2000) (holding that the Boy Scouts’ right of expressive association was violated by a state law
that would have required the group to admit “an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist”
in contravention of its values).
45. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971,
2985 (2010) (noting that it “makes little sense to treat CLS’s speech and association claims as
discrete”).
46. Id. at 2979.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2980. Their beliefs are included in a Statement of Faith, which reads:
Trusting in Jesus Christ as my Savior, I believe in:
• One God, eternally existent in three persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
• God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth.
• The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God’s only Son conceived of the Holy
Spirit, born of the virgin Mary; His vicarious death for our sins through which we
receive eternal life; His bodily resurrection and personal return.

660
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2. Legal analysis in Christian Legal Society
The Court held that the all-comers policy at Hastings was
constitutional.49 Noting that the plaintiffs brought claims both for
freedom of speech and freedom of association, the Court reasoned
that the claims would best be analyzed together under the limited
public forum doctrine.50 The Court reasoned that the all-comers
policy was reasonable in light of the purposes of the forum and that
the regulation was viewpoint neutral because it drew “no distinction
between groups based on their message or perspective.”51
Responding to the plaintiffs’ criticisms of the restrictions, the Court
reasoned that it had “repeatedly stressed that a State’s restriction on
access to a limited public forum ‘need not be the most reasonable or
the only reasonable limitation.’”52 Relying on this reasoning, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of the all-comers policy.53
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION
Like the Supreme Court in Christian Legal Society, the Ninth
Circuit upheld San Diego State University’s nondiscrimination policy
in Alpha Delta.54 The most important elements of the Ninth
Circuit’s legal analysis are discussed below.
A. Christian Legal Society Does Not Control, But It Helps
The court determined that the holding of Christian Legal Society
was not controlling because the Supreme Court explicitly declined to
address the constitutionality of a nondiscrimination policy that
would apply only against certain groups,55 as does SDSU’s. For
• The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration.
• The Bible as the inspired Word of God.
Id. n.3 (quoting App. 226).
49. Id. at 2995.
50. Id. at 2985.
51. Id. at 2993.
52. Id. at 2991 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S.
788, 808 (1985)).
53. Id. at 2995.
54. Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 805 (9th Cir. 2011).
55. Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 (“This opinion, therefore, considers only
whether conditioning access to a student-organization forum on compliance with an all-comers
policy violates the Constitution.”); Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter 648 F.3d at 795. The
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example, SDSU’s nondiscrimination policy prohibits discrimination
“on certain specified bases, for example, race, gender, religion, and
sexual orientation,” but allows discrimination on any other basis.56
Thus, the Supreme Court explicitly declined to rule on the
constitutionality of a policy like the one at SDSU. Instead, the Court
upheld only Hastings’ all-comers policy, which prohibited student
groups from restricting membership on any basis. Despite the
significant differences in the policies at issue in Alpha Delta and
Christian Legal Society, the Ninth Circuit concluded that as a matter
of constitutional principles, SDSU’s policy was not materially
different from the all-comers policy in Christian Legal Society.57
Relying upon this conclusion, the court held that SDSU’s policy was
constitutional.
B. No Violation of Expressive Association and Free Speech Rights
The Ninth Circuit, citing Christian Legal Society, also held that
SDSU’s student organization program created a limited public
forum.58 The Ninth Circuit analyzed both the expressive association
and free speech rights together under the limited public forum
doctrine, as did the Supreme Court in Christian Legal Society.59
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit limited its analysis to whether the
nondiscrimination policy was reasonable in light of the purposes of
the forum and whether the policy was viewpoint neutral.60
1. Reasonable in light of the purposes of the forum
In its reasonableness analysis, the Ninth Circuit first examined
SDSU’s Student Organizations Handbook to determine the purpose
of the school-sponsored clubs.61 Finding several “references to
diversity and nondiscrimination,” the court concluded that one of
the purposes of the student clubs was to “promote diversity and

concurrence agrees that CLS does not control. Alpha Delta Chi-Delta, 648 F3d at 805
(Ripple, J., concurring).
56. Alpha Delta Chi-Delta, 648 F.3d at 795 (majority opinion).
57. Id. at 805.
58. Id. at 797.
59. Id. at 798.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 798–99.
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nondiscrimination.”62 Thus, the court reasoned that requiring
student clubs to adhere to the university’s nondiscrimination policy
was reasonable.63 The Ninth Circuit also found it significant that the
plaintiffs, like those in Christian Legal Society, had alternative means
for communication—including social media, email, and websites—
that would compensate for denying them the communicative means
given to recognized clubs.64
2. Viewpoint neutrality
After concluding that the nondiscrimination policy was
reasonable, the court next analyzed viewpoint neutrality. The
plaintiffs in Alpha Delta argued that the nondiscrimination policy
discriminated based on viewpoint, and in the alternative, that the
policy was discriminatorily applied to them.65 The court disagreed,
reasoning that “a restriction that ‘serves purposes unrelated to the
content of expression’ and only incidentally burdens some speakers,
messages, or viewpoints, ‘is deemed neutral.’”66 The court saw no
evidence that the university adopted the nondiscrimination policy
“for the purpose of suppressing Plaintiffs’ viewpoint, or indeed of
restricting any sort of expression at all.”67 The court further reasoned
that the university’s policy “does not ‘target speech or discriminate
on the basis of its content,’ but instead serves to remove access
barriers imposed against groups that have historically been
excluded.”68 Relying on Truth v. Kent School District, a case in which
the Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a similar
nondiscrimination policy of a high school,69 the court concluded that
SDSU’s nondiscrimination policy was viewpoint- and contentneutral.70

62. Id. at 799.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 800.
66. Id. (quoting Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S.
Ct. 2971, 2994 (2010).
67. Id. at 801.
68. Id. (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,
515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995)).
69. 542 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds by Los Angeles Cnty. v.
Humphries, 131 S.Ct. 447 (2010).
70. Alpha Delta Chi-Delta, 648 F.3d at 803.
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However, in its as-applied analysis of the statute, the court
reasoned that a viewpoint neutral statute can still be unconstitutional
if it is not uniformly applied.71 Noting that the university allowed
recognition to other student groups whose practices appeared to
violate the university’s nondiscrimination policy, the court reversed
in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment.72
C. Equal Protection and Free Exercise Claims
Although this Note does not analyze these claims, it is worth
observing here that the court briefly addressed the plaintiffs’ Equal
Protection and Free Exercise claims and held that the plaintiffs had
raised an issue of material fact regarding the discriminatory
application of the nondiscrimination policy.73
D. The Concurrence
Judge Ripple concurred in the judgment for the sole reason that
he felt that the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Truth v. Kent commanded
such a result.74 However, he expressed his personal disagreement
with the result and argued that SDSU’s policy “marginalize[s] in the
life of the institution those activities, practices and discourses that are
religiously based.”75 Judge Ripple suggested that “at some later
point, this case [would] be an appropriate case for further Supreme
Court review.”76 Judge Ripple lamented the inability of students
within protected categories to participate in student organizations, to
“band together for mutual support and discourse.”77 “Homosexual
students,” for example, “who have suffered discrimination or
ostracism, may not both limit their membership to homosexuals and
enjoy the benefits of official recognition.”78

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
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Id. at 805 (Ripple, J., concurring).
Id. at 806.
Id. at 805.
Id.
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V. ANALYSIS
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Reliance on Christian Legal Society

1. The policies are not materially the same
The Ninth Circuit’s attempt to grapple with Christian Legal
Society is one of the most striking characteristics of Alpha Delta. On
the one hand, the Ninth Circuit correctly acknowledged that its
decision was not controlled by Christian Legal Society because the
Supreme Court reserved for another day the precise question that
the Ninth Circuit was asked to address: the constitutionality of a
policy that allows discrimination except on certain prohibited bases.79
But on the other hand, the Ninth Circuit claimed that Christian
Legal Society supported its holding, concluding that, as a matter of
constitutional principles, SDSU’s nondiscrimination policy is “not
materially different from the content-neutral all-comers policy
approved in Christian Legal Society” and that SDSU’s policy must
therefore be upheld.80
The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Christian Legal Society was
misplaced because the Supreme Court unmistakably and repeatedly
distinguished the type of policy at issue in Alpha Delta—wherein a
nondiscrimination policy applies only against a few groups—from the
policy analyzed in Christian Legal Society, which applies to all
groups. Although the Supreme Court declined for prudential reasons
to rule on the constitutionality of a clubs policy like SDSU’s,81 the
reasoning in the Supreme Court’s opinion suggests that—contrary to
the Ninth Circuit’s assertion—such a policy is, constitutionally
speaking, materially different.
For example, the Court’s reasoning in Christian Legal Society
regarding the viewpoint neutrality of the all-comers policy makes
clear that it was constitutionally significant that the policy applied to
all clubs. The Court noted that although the viewpoint-neutrality
factor of limited public forum analysis typically was a “sticking point”
in the Court’s earlier decisions, the Court reasoned that “we need
not dwell on it” because “[i]t is, after all, hard to imagine a more

79. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of The Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971,
2982–84 (2010); Alpha Delta Chi-Delta, 648 F.3d at 795.
80. Alpha Delta Chi-Delta, 648 F.3d at 803.
81. Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 n.10.
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viewpoint-neutral policy than one requiring all student groups to
accept all comers.”82 This reasoning suggests that the Court’s
analysis would have been different, or at least more difficult, had the
nondiscrimination policy required only some groups to accept
everyone.
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s reasons for distinguishing prior
cases also suggests that the policy addressed by the Ninth Circuit is
materially different from the one addressed by the Supreme Court.
For example, the Supreme Court distinguished Healy v. James,
Widmar v. Vincent, and Rosenberger—cases “in which universities
singled out organizations for disfavored treatment because of their
points of view”—by reasoning that “Hastings’ all-comers
requirement draws no distinction between groups based on their
message or perspective.”83 Moreover, in distinguishing a case that
analyzed the constitutionality of a student-clubs policy that would
allow students, by popular vote, to deny funding to a group, the
Christian Legal Society Court noted that Hastings’s “all-comers
policy governs all [clubs]; Hastings does not pick and choose which
organizations must comply with the policy on the basis of
viewpoint.”84 After making these distinctions, the Court concluded
that the all-comers policy in Christian Legal Society was “textbook
viewpoint neutral.”85 Therefore, the “all-comers” nature of the
Hastings policy was a strong distinguishing characteristic in
Christian Legal Society, and thus was constitutionally significant to
the Court. SDSU’s policy cannot claim these saving principles
because it singles out groups for disfavored treatment and does not
govern all clubs.
One final element of Christian Legal Society shows that the
Supreme Court likely viewed it as constitutionally significant that the
nondiscrimination policy was applied to all student clubs. In its
opinion, the Supreme Court elected not to analyze Hastings’s aswritten nondiscrimination policy, which is similar to SDSU’s policy
because it prohibits “discrimination on several enumerated bases,
including religion and sexual orientation.”86 The dissent and

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
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concurrence analyzed the as-written policy, and the plaintiff urged
the Supreme Court to analyze the as-written policy.87 Instead, the
Supreme Court analyzed only the school’s enforcement of the policy,
in which all student groups were required to adopt an all-comers
policy, or in other words, to “allow any student to participate,
become a member, or seek leadership positions in the organization,
regardless of [her] status or beliefs.”88 The Court spent a significant
portion of its opinion defending its choice to address the all-comers
policy rather than the as-written policy.89 If the two policies were
materially the same, it would not have made sense for the Court to
devote so much of its opinion to defending its decision to analyze
one or the other. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s choice to reserve
for another day the question of the constitutionality of a selective
nondiscrimination policy90 is also strong evidence that the Supreme
Court saw the policy as being constitutionally different, or at least
different enough to raise constitutional or precedential issues. Thus,
the Ninth Circuit erred in its confident assertion that SDSU’s
nondiscrimination policy was not materially different than Hastings’s
policy.
2. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Truth was sufficient authority
The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Christian Legal Society is also
odd because it was unnecessary. The Ninth Circuit could have relied
solely on its own precedent in reaching its result. In an earlier
decision, Truth v. Kent School District, the Ninth Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of a similar nondiscrimination policy adopted by a
high school.91 Truth would have provided sufficient foundation for
the Ninth Circuit’s decision, but the panel apparently wanted to
buttress its reasoning with Supreme Court precedent in addition to
Ninth Circuit precedent. Perhaps the Ninth Circuit, given the clear
reasoning quoted above, viewed Christian Legal Society as raising
some question as to the constitutional soundness of Truth, and

87. Id. at 3000–01 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2995 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at
2982 (majority opinion).
88. Id. at 2983 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
89. Id. at 2982–84.
90. Id. at 2984 n.10.
91. 542 F.3d 634, 639–40 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds by Los Angeles
Cnty. v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447 (2010).
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therefore the Ninth Circuit felt compelled to harmonize the
decisions. If this explanation is accurate, however, the Ninth Circuit
failed to adequately address the Supreme Court’s strong reasoning
suggesting that these policies are constitutionally different.
B. SDSU’s Nondiscrimination Policy Is Not Viewpoint-Neutral
The Ninth Circuit erred in determining that SDSU’s
nondiscrimination policy was viewpoint neutral. The court failed to
adequately consider the Supreme Court’s opinion in Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, wherein the Supreme
Court held that the university engaged in viewpoint discrimination
by withholding, on the basis of student publishers’ religious views,
funding that was available to all other student publishers.92 In
Rosenberger, the University of Virginia allowed student groups to
obtain reimbursements for the printing costs of various student
publications.93 The university denied a reimbursement request by a
Christian student publication because of the university program’s
prohibition on any activity that “primarily promotes or manifests a
particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.”94 The
Court reasoned that “[t]he government must abstain from
regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the
opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the
restriction.”95
Although the policy in Rosenberger was arguably viewpoint
neutral, the Court held that it was not viewpoint neutral because
“the University does not exclude religion as a subject matter but
selects for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with
religious editorial viewpoints.”96 In doing so, the Court relied upon
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, which
held that a school district engaged in viewpoint discrimination by
opening its facilities to the general public on wide-ranging issues and
then denying that benefit to a group because of its religious views.97
Quoting Lamb’s Chapel, the Court reasoned: “[I]t discriminates on

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
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Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 832 (1995).
Id. at 823–24.
Id. at 825 (quoting the school’s policy).
Id. at 829.
Id. at 831.
Id. at 830.
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the basis of viewpoint to permit school property to be used for the
presentation of all views about family issues and child rearing except
those dealing with the subject matter from a religious standpoint.”98
Likewise, SDSU’s program constitutes impermissible viewpoint
discrimination. As in Rosenberger, SDSU provides various benefits to
students, including the ability to discriminate in membership.99 For
example, the student-republican club can discriminate against nonrepublicans in its membership. Under the reasoning of Rosenberger,
SDSU’s policy is viewpoint discriminatory because the university
allows student groups to discriminate in membership except where
the university disagrees with “the specific motivating ideology or the
opinion or perspective of the speaker.”100 Put another way, the
university allows discrimination in membership so long as the
university agrees with the group’s discriminatory ideology or
opinion. This is impermissible viewpoint discrimination under
Rosenberger, and the Ninth Circuit failed to attempt to reconcile its
reasoning with Rosenberger.
SDSU’s policy is in some ways similar to the viewpointdiscriminatory ordinance in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Minn., which,
according to Justice Scalia, allowed fighting words expressed by
those in favor of racial, gender, and sexual-orientation equality, but
punished fighting words expressed by those who disagreed with
those aims.101 Likewise, SDSU allows discriminatory membership
practices by groups with whom the university agrees, but punishes
discriminatory membership practices when exercised by those with
whom the university disagrees. Justice Scalia reasoned in R.A.V. that
the city has “no such authority to license one side of a debate to
fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of
Queensberry rules.”102 This reasoning applies to SDSU with equal
force.

98. Id. (quoting Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
393 (1993)).
99. Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 795 (9th Cir. 2011).
100. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
101. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 391–92 (1992).
102. Id. at 392.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion fails to adequately address
Rosenberger, and the court erroneously held that SDSU’s policy was
viewpoint neutral. The court also erred in attempting to leverage
Christian Legal Society as supporting authority because the Supreme
Court strongly distinguished the type of policy at issue in Alpha
Delta. This decision is a success for university administrators, since a
contrary holding—that the Christian clubs’ right of free speech was
violated by the policy—would likely mean that the university could
not enforce the nondiscrimination policy at all. However, the
decision fails to adequately protect the constitutional freedoms of
university students. Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s assertion, the
Christian clubs in this case were not merely “incidentally
burden[ed]”103 by SDSU’s policy; the clubs were purposely excluded
from the forum by the policy. Judge Ripple rightly observed in his
concurrence that the “net result of this selective policy is therefore to
marginalize in the life of the institution those activities, practices and
discourses that are religiously based.”104
Devin Snow*

103. Alpha Delta Chi-Delta, 648 F.3d at 801.
104. Id. at 806 (Ripple, J., concurring).
 J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University.
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